Abstract: This paper uses survey data for 60,000 households from 29 transition economies in 2006 and 2010 to explore how the use of banking services is related to household characteristics, as well as to bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor protection. At the household level we find that the holding of a bank account, a bank card, or a mortgage increases with income and education in most countries and find evidence for an urban-rural gap. The use of banking services is also related to the religion and social integration of a household as well as the gender of the household head. Using the within-country variation between 2006 and 2010, we find that the privatization of state-owned banks and an increase in market share of foreign banks are associated with a stronger use of banking services. Foreign bank ownership is also associated with a higher use of bank services among highincome households and households with formal employment. State ownership, by contrast is hardly associated with more outreach to poorer households. More generous deposit insurance and stronger creditor rights also foster the use of banking services among the urban, rich, better educated and formally employed.
Introduction
Access to banking services is viewed as a key determinant of economic well-being for households, especially in low-income countries. Savings and credit products make it easier for households to align income and expenditure patterns across time, to insure themselves against income and expenditure shocks, as well as to undertake investments in human or physical capital. Given the importance attributed to financial service access it is striking that there is little cross-country evidence which documents how the use of financial services differs across households and, in particular, how cross-country variation in the structure of the financial sector affects the type of households which are banked.
This paper uses household survey data from 28 transition economies and Turkey taken from the EBRD's Life in Transition Survey (LITS) database to (i) document the use of formal banking services (bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages) across these 29 countries in 2006 and 2010, (ii) relate this use to an array of household characteristics, (iii) gauge the relationship between changes in bank ownership and the financial infrastructure (deposit insurance and creditor protection) and changes in the use of banking services over time within a country, and (iv) assess how cross-country variation in bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor protection affect the composition of the banked population.
The relationship between the ownership structure of the banking system and access to financial services has been intensively discussed, both in the theoretical and empirical literature. On the one hand, government-owned banks often have the mandate to increase access to financial services by firms and households. On the other hand, foreign-owned banks are conjectured to have too centralized organizational structures and to be too risk-averse to reach out towards the low-end of the market. While the recent literature has explored the relationship between the ownership structure of banking markets and access to credit by enterprises, little evidence exists on the relationship between ownership structure in the banking system and the use of formal banking services by households.
Upgrades in the financial infrastructure have often been advocated as instruments to not only deepen but also broaden financial systems. Deposit insurance has been mentioned as a tool to create trust in the financial system, especially for "small" savers. Creditor protection through credit information sharing and creditor rights might also reduce costs and risks for banks to extend credit to larger segments of the population.
Transition economies are an almost ideal sample to study the relationship between bank ownership, the financial infrastructure and household use of banking services. After the fall of communism, these countries had to transform their state-owned, mono-banking systems into two-tier market-based financial systems. 1 Countries, however, chose different financial sector reform paths. 2 Some countries opted for domestic privately-owned banking systems through privatization or the entry of new domestic players. Others opted for foreign bank entry early on, be it through privatization or by encouraging greenfield entry (Claeys and Hainz, 2007) . Countries also moved at different speeds in terms of institutional solutions to protect depositors, e.g. deposit insurance (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2005) and legislation or institutions introduced to protect creditors (Pistor et al., 2000; Brown et al., 2009 ).
Our empirical analysis shows a large variation in the use of banking services across the transition economies. Specifically, we find that in 2010 more than 80 percent of households in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia had a bank account, as opposed to less than 5 percent of households in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This compares to over 90 percent in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the U.K. Within countries we find that the use of banking services is more common among 1 The state-bank systems before the transition had quite extensive networks with large shares of the population having savings accounts. However, besides the notable exceptions of the Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary with high levels of financial intermediation there was little cross-country variation before the on-set of the transition process. 2 See Bonin and Wachtel (2003) for a survey of financial sector reforms in the transition economies.
households located in urban areas, households with higher income, younger households, households headed by a male, as well as for households in which an adult member has university education and formal employment. By contrast, banking products are used less often by households which rely on transfer income and by Muslim households.
Using the within-country variation between 2006 and 2010, we find no consistent relationship between changes in deposit insurance or creditor protection and the share of households which use formal banking services. We do however find that the use of banking services increases in countries which privatized their banking sectors and where the presence of foreign banks increased.
Looking at the types of households which use banking services we find evidence for substantial compositional effects of foreign bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor rights. The market share of foreign banks is positively associated with the use of banking products among high-income and formally employed households. Generous deposit insurance coverage increases the use of financial services among urban, rich and formally employed households. Creditor protection also seems to benefit households with formal employment and higher education. We do not find that state ownership is associated with more outreach to poorer households. We also find no robust evidence that credit information sharing is associated with cross-country variation in the composition of the banked population.
This paper contributes to the nascent literature on household use of formal banking services. On a cross-country level, Beck et al. (2007) find that government (foreign) ownership is negatively associated with outreach as measured by branch penetration (number of accounts per capita), while Beck et al. (2008) find that barriers for bank customers are higher where banking systems are predominantly government-owned and lower where there is more foreign bank participation. Recent household survey collection efforts in Southern and Eastern Africa using FinScope surveys have allowed rigorous analysis of household's use of formal and informal services (see for example, Honohan and King, 2009; Beck et al., 2010; Atiero et al., 2011) . 3 None of the previous literature, however, has used survey data for such a broad cross-section of countries as we do in this paper. Moreover, none of the existing studies has been able to study changes in access to finance over time within a country. This paper is thus the first to examine how changes in the structure of the banking sector over time affects access to finance at the household level. Moreover it is the first study to examine how variation in the structure of the banking sector across countries affects the composition of the banked population.
We also contribute to the extensive literature on the relationship between bank ownership and the use of banking services. This literature makes ambiguous predictions, both for the effect of foreign bank and state bank ownership. Gerschenkron (1962) claims that state-owned banks can overcome market failures and help channeling funds to strategically important projects that are neglected by private financial institutions. 4 However, a large theoretical and empirical literature suggests mission drift by these banks (La Porta et al., 2002) , especially where political interference in the financial system is rampant (Cole, 2009; Sapienza, 2004; and Khwaja and Mian, 2005) . Similarly ambiguous predictions have been made about the effect of foreign bank ownership. Studies of foreign bank entry in developing countries have indicated that local profit motives are an important driving force for entry.
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This would suggest that foreign banks are interested in offering services to a broader clientele (see, for example, Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Buch and DeLong, 2004; and Buch and Lipponer, 2004) . However, the most recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that 3 There have been a series of country-level studies on Brazil, Mexico, and Romania, among others, over the past ten years. Most of these, however, use a sample that is geographically limited, even within the respective country. For a broader overview and discussion, see World Bank (2007). 4 Government-owned savings banks in Western Europe were often founded with the explicit goal of expanding access to formal banking services to low-income individuals and postal savings banks often achieve a large clientele (Baums, 1994; World Bank, 2006) . 5 Earlier U.S. based studies on foreign bank entry in the 1980s suggest that foreign banks are not interested in offering services to the population at large but that they primarily "follow their clients" (see Goldberg and Saunders, 1981a,b; Cho et al., 1987; Hultman and McGee, 1989; and Goldberg and Grosse, 1994, among others) .
foreign banks tend to "cherry pick" (see, for example, Detragiache et al. 2008; Gormley, 2010; and Mian, 2006) Our paper is the first to our knowledge which examines how the quality of the financial infrastructure, i.e. deposit insurance and creditor protection, affects the use of banking services at the household-level. Evidence based on aggregate cross-country data suggests that generous deposit insurance does not foster financial intermediation but increases the fragility of the financial sector (Cull et al., 2005) . Cross-country variation in information sharing and creditor rights have been related to aggregate credit levels (Djankov et al. 2007 ) as well as to firms' access to credit (Beck et al., 2004; Love and Mylenko, 2003) .
With respect to transition countries, Brown et al. (2009) show that countries that established credit registries at an earlier stage have already seen a positive impact on firm financing, by increasing availability and lowering cost, especially to more opaque firms. Haselman and Wachtel (2007) show that banks in better functioning legal environments are more willing to lend to SMEs and to provide mortgages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the data and section 3 discusses the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
Data
Our household-level data are taken from the EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey Azerbaijan, and unlimited coverage in Tajikistan. By contrast, due to increases in average income levels deposit insurance coverage in Poland fell from five times to three times GDP per capita, while in Slovakia it fell from four times to less than two times GDP per capita.
We use two indicators of creditor protection which are taken from the World Bank We find that the use of bank services is higher in countries with a higher share of foreignowned banks, more generous deposit insurance and higher GDP per capita, while it is lower in countries with higher inflation.. The use of mortgages is negatively associated with the level of non-performing loans. There are also significant rank correlations between some of the country-level factors that we will relate to the use of banking services. There is a negative and significant correlation between foreign and state ownership, which can be explained by the privatization of state-owned banks to foreign owners in many transition economies.
Inflation is higher in countries with lower foreign bank ownership, higher state-ownership and lower deposit insurance coverage.
The Table 4 Panel B rank correlations show that the use of banking services, the ownership structure, financial infrastructure and macroeconomic environment are also rank correlated over time within countries. Here, we present rank correlations of the differences in the country-level variables between 2006 and 2010. We find that increases in the use of accounts are significantly correlated with increases in the use of cards and mortgages, while changes in the use of cards and mortgages are not significantly correlated with each other.
We also find that the privatization of state-owned banks is significantly rank correlated with increases in the use of banking services. Few of the other rank correlations are significant. Table 4 here
Methodology
In the first step of our empirical analysis we relate our indicators of banking service use B h,c of household h in country c to characteristics of the household X h controlling for country level determinants with country-fixed effects α c :
We run regression (1) separately for the 2006 and the 2010 data as well as on a pooled sample, including a dummy variable LITS 2010 for observations from the 2010 wave of the survey. We run regression (1) as a probit regression, with error terms clustered at the countrylevel to control for possible correlation between error terms across households within countries.
We expect that urban households, households with higher income, households with formal employment and households with higher education levels are more likely to use banking services. By contrast we expect that households which rely on self-employment and transfer income are less likely to use banking services than households with wage income.
We expect households with male heads to be more likely to use formal banking services.
Households which do not speak an official language are hypothesized to be less likely to have a bank account. Finally, we expect that Muslim households are less likely to use banking services. Grosjean (2011) shows that regions in South-East Europe which were under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, and thus the religious based prohibition of interest-lending persisted longer, show a significant lower level of financial development.
In the second step of our empirical analysis, we exploit the time dimension of our data (i.e. repeated cross-section) and relate changes in the use of banking services to an array of country-level variables:
where Z c,t is a vector of time-varying country-level indicators. Controlling for country-fixed effects and household characteristics (and thus for changes in sample composition between 2006 and 2010), we gauge the relationship between changes in country-level factors and changes in the likelihood of using banking services. As in regression (1), we run this regression as probit model and allow for clustering on the country level.
As discussed above, the literature has made different predictions about the relationship between ownership structure of the banking system and the use of banking services. On the one hand, foreign-owned banks have superior technologies and organizational structures enabling them to reach out to a larger share of the population. On the other hand, they might cherry-pick and focus on the most profitable segments of the population, ultimately reducing access to financial services. While state-owned banks often have the explicit mandate to foster broad access to finance, inefficiencies and mission drift might prevent them from doing so. More generous deposit insurance can increase trust in the banking system, but can also undermine this trust if the consequent moral hazard risk results in more aggressive risk taking by banks and ultimately higher bank fragility (Cull et al., 2005) . More effective systems of credit information sharing and stronger creditor rights are expected to increase the use of bank cards and mortgages, as it reduces the costs of these products.
In the final step of our analysis we examine how the structure of bank-ownership in each country as well as the development of the financial infrastructure affect the use of banking services across different household types. Specifically, we focus on the interaction of our indicators of bank-ownership and financial infrastructure (Foreign banks, State banks, Deposit insurance, Credit information, Creditor rights) with selected household-level explanatory variables (Urban, Expenses, University degree, Formal employed). We focus on these specific household characteristics as theory makes specific predictions about the relationship between ownership and infrastructure, on the one hand, and use by population groups with these characteristics, on the other hand. We control for level effects across countries as well as time effects with country-year fixed effects.
As before, we allow for clustering of error terms on the country-level, but estimate regression (3) with a linear probability model due to the difficulty of interpreting the marginal effects of interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003) . 14 By including country-year dummies, we focus on the relationship between the country-level factors and the composition of the banked population, controlling for changes in these relationships over time. We also control for the interaction of these household characteristics with GDP per capita so as not to mix up compositional effects of aggregate income levels with those of our financial sector variables.
Based on the hypothesis that foreign banks cherry pick clients in host countries, we expect that foreign bank ownership may encourage the use of banking services particularly 14 In unreported regressions, we confirm our findings qualitatively using probit regressions.
among urban, wealthy, formally employed, and better educated households. By contrast, if state-owned banks contribute to a broader access of financial services we expect that rural households and lower-income households benefit particularly from state-bank presence.
Our predictions concerning the relationship between our indicators of financial infrastructure and the use of bank services are ambiguous. Lower income households might be more likely to open bank accounts in countries with a higher deposit insurance coverage.
Alternatively, it might be richer, wealthier and better educated segments of the population who are informed about deposit insurance and are hence attracted to banks in countries with higher deposit insurance coverage. We predict that in countries with better credit information sharing and creditor rights the costs and risk for banks to reach out to more marginal segments of the population might be reduced. On the demand side, however, improved creditor protection could encourage the use of credit by households with formal employment and higher income which may be more likely to use external finance to invest and smooth consumption. Table 6 . Table 6 here
Results

A. Household determinants of the use of bank services
The Table 6 results confirm that the use of banking services is significantly related to household location, income, wealth, economic activity and religion. The reported estimates in columns (3), (6) and (9) Controlling for other household characteristics, larger households are more likely to use banking services, which is contrary to our univariate comparisons in How robust are our household-level results across countries? To check the robustness of our results we replicate model 3 of Table 6 for each country separately. The results displayed in Table 7 suggest that the positive relation between the use of a bank account and household income and household education are highly robust. While we find substantial variation in the economic magnitude of their effect, household Expenses yield a highly significant coefficient in each of our country-specific regressions except for Estonia and Tajikistan. Similarly, our indicator of education (University degree) is significant at the 10 percent level in 24 of the 29 regressions. By contrast, the effects of household location (Urban), economic activity (Formal employed), transfer income receivers, demographic structure (Size, Age, Male), social status (Language) and religion (Muslim) are less robust across countries.
17 Table 7 here 17 The estimates for some countries are imprecise, due to the fact that the prevalence of bank accounts is either very low (less than 10% in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) or very high (more than 90% in Slovenia and Estonia). Several variables are dropped from the country-specific probit regressions as they perfectly predict the outcome.
B. Bank-ownership, financial infrastructure, and the use of banking services over time
This section explores how changes in bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor protection affect the share of households which use banking services. Exploiting the fact that we have two survey waves at different points in time, we can relate the within-country variation in the use of banking services to within-country variation in our financial sector indicators by controlling for country fixed effects and changes in the composition of the sample, using regression model (2).
Before presenting regression results, we briefly discuss some ocular econometrics, as presented in Figures 1 -3 . Here we plot the changes in the use of bank accounts, cards and mortgages against changes in our different country-level variables. Across all regressions, we also include the share of non-performing loans in total loans as gauge of the severity of the crisis. While Panel A uses the full sample, Panel B reports subsample analyses in an attempt to control for demand and supply effects.
Table 8 here
The Table 8 Panel A regression results confirm that changes in bank ownership impact on the use of banking services. Our key finding is that a reduction in state ownership of banks is associated with a significant increase in the use of bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages.
The impact of bank privatization on the use of bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages is Our multivariate results suggest that there is no consistent relationship between changes in the financial infrastructure and the use of banking services. Deposit insurance coverage is not significantly associated with the use of bank accounts or cards, while the quality of credit information systems is not significantly associated with the use of cards or mortgages.
Creditor rights are -surprisingly -negatively and significantly associated with the use of cards.
Considering our macroeconomic controls we find a negative relationship between changes in non-performing loans, i.e. the severity of the financial crisis, and the use of bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages, though the coefficient does not enter significantly for bank cards. Inflation, is significantly and positively associated with the use of accounts and cards, but not with the use of mortgages. Finally, we find a strong and significant relationship between GDP per capita and the use of mortgages, but not with the use of accounts or cards.
The significant effects of bank privatization and foreign bank market share observed in Table 8 we use subsample analyses to account for reverse causality due to anticipated demand. First, we limit our sample to households that have a bank account, and thus demonstrate a demand for financial services, and test for the relationship between household and country-level variables and the use of bank cards and mortgages (Columns 1 and 2). This sample restriction focuses on the supply of financial services in addition to a simple bank account. We continue to find that foreign bank ownership is positively and significantly associated with the use of bank cards, while the share of government-owned banks is negatively and significantly associated with the use of mortgages by home owners.
Our second approach to control for financial service demand at the household level is to limit our sample to households that express a high level of trust in financial institution. The LITS survey elicits households' trust in a range of political institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGO's), law enforcing agencies, as well as "banks and the financial system".
We restrict our sample to those households which report a higher level of trust in the banks and the financial system than their average trust level in political institutions, NGO' and law enforcement institutions of their home country (Columns 3 to 5). In these specifications we again find that the foreign bank share is associated with a higher use of bank cards, while a higher share of government-owned banks is associated with lower use of bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages. Together, these results suggest that the correlation between changes in bank ownership and the increased use of banking services is not primarily driven by (anticipated) demand but rather by supply side effects.
C. Bank-ownership, financial infrastructure, and the composition of the banked population
The results displayed in Table 7 show that the use of bank services across households displays strong country-specific patterns. These differences in the composition of banked households may be related to the large differences in economic development (GDP per capita) across our sample of countries. They may, however, also be driven by differences in the ownership structure of the banking sector, as well as the financial infrastructure. Our previous results focus on the relationship between the level of bank ownership, the financial infrastructure and household use of banking services (using within-country variation). Bank ownership, deposit insurance, credit information sharing or creditor rights may, however, also have an impact on the composition of the banked population. In this section, we focus on four household characteristics and gauge whether bank ownership and the financial sector infrastructure have a differential impact on urban, richer, better educated and formally employed households, using regression model (3). Tables 9 and 10 report the results. In all specifications we control for the main effect of all household level characteristics employed in Table 5 , as well as country-year fixed effects. The latter allow us to focus on the crosssectional compositional effects of bank ownership and the financial infrastructure, while making full use of our repeated cross-section data. Our variables of interest in this section are
the interaction terms of Foreign banks, State banks, Deposit insurance, Credit information
and Creditor rights with the household characteristics Urban, Expenses, University degree, and Formal employed .
Table 9 here
The results in Table 9 provide some evidence for cherry picking behavior by foreign banks. Specifically, households where the respondent is formally employed are more likely to use a bank account, a card or a mortgage in countries with higher shares of foreign banks. We also find that households with higher income and where the respondent has a university degree are more likely to have a mortgage in countries with a higher share of foreign banks.
To assess the economic relevance of these compositional effects compare for example the impact of being formal employed in Slovenia with 21 percent foreign bank assets to Croatia with 91 percent foreign bank assets. Our estimates suggest that a household with formal employment is not more likely to have a bank account than a household without formal employment in Slovenia, while in Croatia households with formal employment are 10 percentage points more likely to have a bank account than those without.
We find hardly any evidence for the hypothesis that state-bank ownership leads to more inclusive financial sectors. Poorer or rural households are not more likely to have a bank account, a card or a mortgage in countries with a higher share of state-owned banks. We do, however, find that the use of bank cards and mortgages is less conditional on household education levels in countries with more state-owned banks.
Finally, we find that economic development (as proxied by GDP per capita) benefits mostly richer and urban households where the respondent has a university degree and is formally employed.
The Table 10 regressions suggest that in countries with more generous deposit insurance coverage urban households and households with formal employment are more likely to have a bank account or card. Again to assess the economic relevance of these effects compare Poland where deposit insurance is 3 times GDP per capita to neighboring Ukraine where deposit insurance is only 20 percent of GDP per capita. Our estimates suggest that urban households are not more likely to have a bank account than rural households in Ukraine, whereas the rural-urban gap is 3 percentage points in Poland. In unreported regressions, we confirm our findings on the role of deposit insurance using a dummy variable indicating the existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme.
The Table 10 regressions show no effects of credit information sharing on the composition of the banked population, while creditor rights have a limited effect on the type of households which are banked. Households where the respondent is formally employed or has a university degree are more likely to have a bank card in countries with stronger creditor rights. However, this effect is not confirmed for the use of mortgages.
Table 10 here
Overall, the results in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that bank ownership and the development of the financial infrastructure do have compositional effects on the banked population. Our results are consistent with hypotheses that see foreign banks cherry-picking their clients rather than broadening access. By contrast they provide very little support to the hypothesis that state bank ownership broadens the use of financial services to marginalized groups. We find no evidence to support the hypothesis that financial infrastructure improvements mainly benefit previously unbanked groups. On the contrary, if anything generous deposit insurance coverage and improved creditor protection seem to mostly encourage higher-income, urban and formally employed segments of the population to use banking services.
Conclusions
This paper explores the characteristics of households which use deposit, payment and credit services in transition countries and relates the level and composition of the banked population across countries to variations in bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor protection. Using data across 28 transition economies and Turkey, we find a strong correlation of household location, income, economic activity and education with the use of banking services. We find evidence that the use of banking services is higher in countries where banks have been privatized and the market share of foreign banks has increased. Our results shed doubt on the ability of structural policy to broaden the financial system to disadvantaged groups. Specifically, attempts to broaden the use of financial services through liberalization of the banking sector or more generous deposit insurance do not increase the likelihood that poorer, less educated and rural segments of the population use formal financial services. Similarly, a better contractual and information framework does not seem to foster financial inclusion. Our results do not imply that these policies do not foster financial sector development, rather that it is difficult to target this development to certain groups. The table reports means for each variable for the full sample as well as for the sub-samples of households with and without a bank account, with and without a bank card, and with and without a mortgage. All means are adjusted for sample weighting in the LITS survey. The sample tests report the results of linear independant sample tests which examine whether household characteristics differ for households with and without a bank account, bank card or mortgage. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Definition and sources of the variables are provided in Table 1 . 
